Brexit – Lies, lies and statistics

23 April, 2016
As appeared in TheStar.com.my

THE debate in Britain on whether the country should get out or remain in the European Union (EU) is fascinating on a number of scores.

The statistics often adduced on the cost and benefit of doing one or the other have become mired in a sea of lies and contradiction. Many are confused, and are turning away from the numbers, often disbelieving them.

It has become a strategy the quitters have stumbled upon. They started it by contending the EU cost Britain £350mil a week. Money, they evocatively proclaimed, that is better spent on the ailing National Health Service. When their contention was contradicted, as the UK actually gets back quite a bit of that money, they quietly dropped that particular number.

They still played around with the aggregated £18bil number, ignoring EU rebates and discounts which left the net contribution at £8.5bil.

There is no consensus number on how much economic activity and growth the 500 million EU market generates for Britain against that net contribution, but the remain side are clear, should Britain decide to leave on June 23, there would be a loss of over a million jobs, including 100,000 in the City of London. Denied of course by the quitters.

By the time the UK Treasury came out this week with its excellent study on the cost of leaving, all numbers were already wobbling. Thus some sobering numbers from the Treasury report, a £36bil hole in government revenue which would have to be filled either by a rise of 8 pence on basic rate of income tax or 7 pence on VAT, were dismissed as scaremongering.

The calculation that British households would be £4,300 poorer and the economy 6.2% smaller by 2030 was considered as not worthy of consideration coming, the quitters pronounced, from the “unreliable” UK Treasury – with no concern for the reputational damage to an important institution in government whose work is otherwise generally acclaimed.

Instead, an honest admission in that report that Britain was not likely to keep immigration numbers below 100,000 a year while remaining in the EU, was seized upon as failure by Prime Minister David Cameron to fulfill a previous promise.

Indeed it is the emotive issues like sovereignty, immigration and Cameron’s benefit of a few thousand pounds from his father’s off-shore company, that are moving the masses. Never mind no wrongdoing on Cameron’s part was revealed by the Panama Papers – it was the big OC: off-shore company!

This is where the remain side may be losing out, the appeal to emotion, sometimes to some rather base instincts. The speech by Boris Johnson, leading leave proponent, at the start of the official campaign on the referendum a week last Friday, was full of it. It was rabble-rousing, filled with references to French knickers and how empty in the head Romanians were. Who could the remain side rouse the populace against?

President Barack Obama can come along and intone how important the British voice is within Europe, how Britain’s weight would be much reduced outside the EU, and why the European venture started: to stop wars between its big powers and to unite the continent for the benefit of its peoples.

But who among the hoi polloi is going to listen to him, set against how Britain has lost its sovereignty to those bloody foreigners and unelected bureaucrats in Europe? The scary thing is even the better informed have come to hold this deep grudge against the EU.

By discrediting the numbers the leave side has made the emotive issues the centerpiece, the matters of concern and for decision.

Some rather excellent arguments the more level-headed informed public would consider quite persuasive get lost in the jingoistic din.

For example columnist Martin Wolf, who writes for the Financial Times, quite brilliantly made the point as Britain will always have the “perpetual option” to leave, the real question is why it should want to leave now, especially as the quitters have absolutely no idea how they want the UK to be associated with the EU afterwards. And would the other partner in an acrimonious divorce be ready to give any kind of good deal?

On the other hand, he demonstrates with supporting statistics, not all drawn from the Treasury, how exercising the option to depart would deliver immediate losses.

But how many people read and understand Martin Wolf? The remain side has to make points such as his in SMS form: Don’t be stupid; We are going to lose our jobs; We have to pay more tax! For good measure, if there is something that could diminish the EPL – such as a freeze on mobility of football talent and higher ticket prices from lower British-centric earnings – the remain side might be on to a winner.

While there is no doubt the statistical cost and benefit analysis, and the geopolitical as well as geoeconomic issues, do matter, and will have resonance with sober and informed voters, there are also those who are not particularly bothered about Britain’s voice in the world.

They have to be reached in language and on matters that more immediately concern them. Indeed, Alaister Campbell, the veteran communications practitioner, makes the point that there is a huge gap in the remain campaign – it is not hitting social media and has not addressed opinion formation that is derived from views chat and peer groups are exchanging.

For us in Malaysia, it is interesting to observe how even with an informed and sophisticated electorate, facts and figures can be manipulated and made confusing, even to the point of not accepting self-evident truths.

How appeal to base instincts becomes an easy populist option which disfigures facts and, more damagingly, other people. The them, against us. We do this too often in Malaysia, even without the kind of existential debate now taking place in Britain.

For Asean, while it should guard against any sense of superiority and complacency, I must confess to a sense of amusement when it was put to me that perhaps our regional association is better founded than the EU. This is a turn-up for the books, as Asean has been frequently perceived, especially in academic circles in the UK, as insufficient and deficient.

There is the suggestion that perhaps Asean has been wise to proceed with its “community-building” in the way it has done, step-by-step, without rushing, with not too much legalese.

We must however not get too carried away. We can not make too much progress just to be safe. There are other regional organizations or associations to choose from which could become more eminent. The challenges within the “Asean community”, such as has been achieved, must be addressed, like the development gap among member states and enhancing the business performance of MSMEs (micro, small and medium enterprises).

Slow and steady may be good, but it should not become somnambulistic. The EU might be going through a rough time – and the British in particular are now tossing and shaking it about – but the historic magnitude of its achievement should not be under-rated. Against this, Asean still has some considerable way to go.

China-ASEAN Monitor Weekly

Politics and Security

China’s Xi Jinping takes commander in chief military title
China’s President Xi Jinping is now commander in chief of the military’s Joint Operations Command Centre, in his latest move to exert greater control over the armed forces. Mr Xi is already General Secretary of the Communist Party, and chair of the Central Military Commission, which manages the People’s Liberation Army. Correspondents say that, given Mr Xi’s consolidation of power in China, the move will be interpreted by some as a propaganda message that he is now in absolute control. But he was already in military command and to most Chinese ears the phrase is unlikely to conjure up the same resonances as it does in English translation.

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New Philippine president might be softer on China
The South China Sea territorial dispute has led the outgoing Philippine administration of President Benigno Aquino to step up military co-operation with the US and Japan but there is speculation that the new Philippine president elected on 9 May could be more conciliatory. The presidential candidates Rodrigo Duterte, Grace Poe, and Jejomar Binay have not ruled out reviving diplomacy with Beijing, a strategy the outgoing government evidently gave up on.

Read More >

 

Trade and Investment

China investors target Southeast Asia
After a record-breaking first quarter of 2016 for Chinese outbound mergers and acquisitions focused on the US and Europe, more mainland-based companies are poised to follow Alibaba in targeting assets in the fast-growing ASEAN region. Alibaba group last week agreed to take a US$1 billion controlling stake in Singapore-based online shopping start-up Lazada, marking Alibaba’s biggest cross-border deal. Some 47% of large Chinese corporations surveyed identified ASEAN as their top destination for investment over the next three years.

Read More >

 

Bank of China opens branch in Brunei
Bank of China has been granted approval to open a branch in Brunei — the first time that a Chinese financial institution has established a presence in the oil-rich sultanate. News of the bank deal follows a steady flow of Chinese investment into Brunei, including a US$6 billion project to construct an oil refinery and petrochemical production facility. Bank of China linked described Brunei as “one of the important countries along the Belt and Road route, politically stable and strategically located with well-developed infrastructure”.

Read More >

 

China investments to lift Malaysia’s outlook
Malaysia’s economic and business outlook from official projections and private sector surveys looks meek, but this may be lifted by the massive inflow of Chinese funds and investments. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang promised to help embattled Malaysia overcome its economic problems during his official visit to Kuala Lumpur last November. Since then, state-owned China General Nuclear Power Corp purchased 1MDB’s energy assets in Edra Global Energy Bhd, China Railway Construction Corporation purchased a substantial equity stake in Bandar Malaysia and then last month, China Railway Engineering Corporation announced its plan to set up its multi-billion regional headquarters in Bandar Malaysia, which will host the main terminal for the planned KL-Singapore High Speed Rail. China’s government has also started buying more Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) and this inflow of new money could possibly rise 8.5% of Malaysia’s total outstanding MGS in early April.

Read More >

 

The Chinese Economy

First-quarter growth slows a bit in China, as expected
As expected, China’s growth rate slowed to 6.7% in the first quarter of the year but a notable pickup in debt-driven industrial activity last month probably cushioned the slowdown. The quarterly rate was the slowest since the depths of the financial crisis in 2009 but in line with the government’s target this year for a 6.5-7% growth. China is increasingly a two-speed economy. Traditional industries like steel, mining and manufacturing are mired in a brutal downturn but there is growth in consumer demand leading to a thriving services sector, e-commerce and high-tech companies.

Read More >

Myanmar Monitor Weekly

National

New Clashes in Western Myanmar Leave Army Commander, 20 Soldiers Dead
Army commander Myo Min Tun and 20 soldiers from the government army were killed during fresh fighting with an armed ethnic army in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state during hostilities that erupted on 16 April, a spokesman for the rebel army said on 19 April. “Some from the AA are injured, but no one was killed,” he added. The Myanmar military, which rarely discusses battle casualties, was not available for comment.
Read More >

21 die in boat capsize off Myanmar: UN
At least 21 people including nine children died after a boat capsized in rough waters off the coast of Myanmar’s restive Rakhine state on 19 April, a UN spokesman said. The vessel was transporting around 60 passengers, majority of whom were internally displaced people from the Sin Tet Maw camp, to a local market for an “authorised day trip”, according to Pierre Peron, a spokesman for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Myanmar.
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Politics

Child labour poses challenge for Myanmar government
The demand for labour has risen drastically since the Myanmar economy opened up five years ago. About one-in-five children aged 10-17 go to work instead of school, despite laws that curb child labour. “I think it should be a priority area but needs to be combined with positive policies. If you try to ban child labour, there’s a danger that you drive it underground,” said Michael Slingsby from the United Nations Development Programme. The new government which took power this month has said tackling child labour was one of the party’s goals.
Read More >

 

Business and Investment

Chevron seeks buyers for Myanmar gas assets worth $1.3 billion
US oil and gas major Chevron Corp has put its Myanmar gas block stakes worth an estimated US$1.3 billion up for sale in what would mark the biggest M&A transaction involving the country’s assets. Sources said suitors could number about half a dozen and would likely include Australia’s Woodside Petroleum, Thailand’s PTT Exploration and Production, Japanese trading houses and Chinese companies.
Read More >

Viettel placing US$1.5 billion bet on Myanmar’s mobile market
Vietnam’s military-run telecom company, Viettel Group, intends to invest US$1.5 billion in a joint venture in Myanmar’s burgeoning wireless market. A Viettel representative said the company secured a license from Myanmar’s government earlier this month and is now in final negotiations with two Myanmar companies to form a joint enterprise, of which Viettel will own 49%.
Read More >

Int’l bank group provides loan for Myanmar industrial port development
World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) has provided a US$ 40 million long-term loan to boost the development of Myanmar Industrial Port (MIP), according an IFC announcement on 19 April. The loan is the first phase of a US$ 200 million long-term senior loan financed by IFC to support the port to complete the first phase of its expansion plans.
Read More >

China ASEAN Monitor

Politics and Security

Panama papers: how China’s great firewall is protecting its leaders

While several of China’s most powerful politicians have been linked to the “Panama Papers” leaks, blanket Internet censorship has prevented the country’s citizens from learning about it. The names of relatives of President Xi Jinping and other powerful members of the Communist Party have come up in relation to secretive offshore companies, prompting a media blackout and the censoring of social media and the Internet through the so-called Great Firewall of China.

Read More >


China to release more water to alleviate Southeast Asia drought

China will release more water from a dam in its southwestern province of Yunnan to help alleviate a drought in parts of Southeast Asia, China’s Foreign Ministry said on 12 April, following an initial release begun last month. The actual amount of water released will be decided upon by how much water there is to release upstream and the demands of downstream users. Thailand is facing its worst water shortage in two decades and in Vietnam some 1.8 million people are facing water shortages.

Read More >


Vietnam tells China to pull its oil rig as new Prime Minister takes office

Vietnam’s new Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said in his inaugural speech on 7 April that he would defend Vietnam’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, referring to the ongoing territorial disputes with China. The same day the government in Hanoi told Beijing to pull its oil rig from waters between the two countries that haven’t been demarcated yet and urged China not to drill for oil or gas in the area.

Read More >

China, ASEAN countries to improve anti-terror cooperation

China and ASEAN countries decided to improve their cooperation in security and anti-terrorism during a meeting in Beijing on 7 April. China is ready to work with ASEAN countries to put into action the common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security strategy for Asia, which was previously proposed by President Xi Jinping at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in 2014.

Read More >


The Chinese Economy

China stanches flow of money out of the country, data suggests

New data suggests that China has stanched, at least for now, the heavy flow of money that flowed out of the country last yeast. Estimated at nearly US$1 trillion, the money flow was seen as a sign of growing scepticism about the Chinese economy. Chinese officials said on 7 April that the country’s foreign exchange reserves grew in March, for the first time in five months. Those reserves of about US$3.21 trillion are a rough proxy for the money moving in and out of the country.

Read More >

Strong quake hits Myanmar, tremors felt in India

National

An earthquake of a magnitude 6.9 hit northern Myanmar on 13 April at a depth of 135km, nearly 400km north of Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw. The quake was also felt in parts of eastern India and Bangladesh. There were no immediate reports of injuries or damages, according to the government.

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Politics

Myanmar’s New Government Frees More Than 100 Political Prisoners

A total of 113 political prisoners in Myanmar were freed on 9 April under an amnesty ordered by the country’s new de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, as her first official act. The move was praised by human rights advocates, but a jarring note was struck when two peace activists were each sentenced on 8 April to two years with hard labour for activities in relations to an armed ethnic group.

Read More >


Economy

China firm wins Myanmar approval for US$3 billion refinery

Chinese state-controlled commodity trader Guangdong Zhenrong Energy Co has won approval from the Myanmar Investment Committee (MIC) to build a long-planned US$3 billion refinery in southeast coastal city of Dawei. The project, which also includes an oil terminal, storage and distribution facilities, would be one of the largest foreign investments in decades in Myanmar. The approval was rushed through by the outgoing government, before the new NLD government took power at the end of March.

Read More >

Garment exports predicted to reach US$12 billion by 2020

Myanmar’s garment exports is expected to be worth US$12 billion and employ 1.5 million people by 2020, according to a state media report, which attributed the ambitious figures to an unnamed source. Garment exports were expected to recover to about US$2 billion last year and the sector now employs about 250 thousand people, according to the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association.

Read More >


Foreign Affairs

Obama Congratulates Myanmar on Historic Democratic Milestone

US President Obama congratulated his Myanmar counterpart, President Htin Kyaw, in a phone call on 6 April and applauded the National League for Democracy (NLD) leadership for reaching a historic milestone in democratic reform. Obama said the US is willing to provide future assistance and asked to remain informed of Myanmar’s future plans. Obama also spoke with Aung San Suu Kyi and commended her efforts over many years to achieve a peaceful transfer of power and advance national reconciliation

Read More >

Asean – strategic impact of not taking a stand

9 April, 2016
As appeared in TheStar.com.my

CHINA is now the second largest economy in the world by size of gross domestic product (GDP). The deceleration in its economic growth rate affects all other economies, especially other growing economies dependent on trade with the country. Asean, for instance, counts China as its No. 1 trading partner.

While there are elements of envy at what China has achieved over the past 3½ decades, much of the restrained pleasure over its economic discomfiture is derived from Beijing’s belligerent conduct of rising power foreign policy, especially currently in the South China Sea (SCS).

It would make more eminent sense for the world looking in, however, to couple China’s interest in economic restructure and recovery with its responsible and restrained conduct of affairs in the community of nations.

This communication has to be done in a subtle but recognisable manner, not just in more obvious and sometimes clumsy ways. In private discussions on China’s SCS threats and activities, it has been suggested Beijing should be made to understand the cost of its uncompromising stand which leads it to ride roughshod over the claims and interests of all other countries.

In the first place, a line has to be drawn to show China cannot do whatever its wants without cost. In the worst case scenario military cost with consequent debilitation of economic relationships might be envisaged. The situation is far from this stage, but there has to be clear communication of this resolve.

American freedom of navigation movements in the SCS are intended to show there are international rights the United States will continue to exercise come what may. Japan’s increasing military cooperation with the Philippines may be subsidiary, but is another component of resolve not welcomed by China.

If this resolve is tested and found to be credible there could be war. It is important therefore that there is no ambiguity about it. During the Cold War there was a Balance of Terror between the Soviet Union and the United States which dissuaded them from getting into that last mile, best illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

These days, however, nuclear military capability is more widespread. But insofar as China and the United States are concerned the risk of conflict between them is mitigated by their very close economic interdependence, something that was never the case between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Still, there could be a Madcap or a Princeling who might just pull the trigger. The common thing between the demagogue and an aristocrat is that they are inclined to be populist and can be driven by the combination of heady rhetoric and sense of destiny.

During the Cold War days Herman Kahn invited us to think of the unthinkable. And Henry Kissinger wrote of limited nuclear warfare. These days, however, we – especially in Asean – are either complacent in our economic comfort zone or lulled by financial promise to think about how to manage the risk of military conflict.

It does not manage itself. The fact there is Asean does not ensure there will be no military conflict between China and the United States. The fact there is Asean has not protected some of its members from suffering cuts and bruises, if not yet a bloody nose, at the hands of China in the SCS.

Vietnam most of all. The Philippines now the most vulnerable. Even Indonesia, a non-claimant SCS state, has not been spared. Who next? What next?

Asean’s response to Chinese actions in the SCS has really taken two forms, neither of which can be considered a strategy by any stretch of the imagination.

First an arduous process at statement making which now stands at the threat China’s actions pose to regional peace and stability in November last year, a small step but something considered a giant leap by Asean.

Second, a painstaking effort to get China to agree to the code of conduct (COC) in the SCS and, more recently, extension of the code for unplanned encounters at sea to the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the SCS, however, they may be defined or claimed I guess.

China ignores the first and drags its feet on the second. Meanwhile, its reclamation activities have taken place in seven contested atolls, with three of them militarised. It is widely speculated that the next would be Scarborough Shoal, over which there was a stand-off with the Philippines in 2012. It is well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and not too distant from the Filipino island of Palawan.

It is not particularly surprising that the Philippines should want to take action against these encroachments and that, arguably, Manila is the only Asean state that has any kind of strategy to counter China’s quite blatant actions.

While military arrangements and cooperation with the United States. and now, Japan, may be its more evident moves, they are really an insurance policy. Like most non-life insurance policies the hope is you will not have to use it, but if you had to, the underwriter(s) will stand ready to deliver.

Lack of trust

This of course does not endear the Philippines to the Chinese. Actually, all other Asean member states, especially claimants in the SCS disputes, have a similar sort of hope – but without taking out the policy. So they continue to get Chinese financial largesse while the Philippines gets its bananas lit up in a bonfire in Shenzen for, allegedly, over-use of fertilisers against China’s very high standards and stringent regulations!

Thus, it is not surprising there is so much lack of trust even among just the Asean SCS claimant states. Let alone if the others, like Cambodia and Laos, are included.

I had said the Philippines had a strategy because it goes beyond that insurance policy. Its strategy can be found in the case it has taken to international arbitration for an opinion on the legality of China’s nine-dash line (which pretty well makes the SCS an enclosed Chinese archipelagic sea) and claims to Filipino territorial waters. Even if China has spurned participation in the case, the opinion of the arbitration body, based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, will not be without effect.

Again, another reason for Chinese anger at the Philippines. The ruling of the arbitrators could be the objective check on China’s extravagant claims. Of course it is frequently said international law is often of no effect but, for China, which differentiates itself as a great power which adheres to the “democratic” UN system, any adverse opinion cannot be blithely ignored, before the bar of world opinion.

Just imagine what would happen if there were to be a UN General Assembly resolution as well calling for the observation of the arbitration body’s ruling. While, to be sure, such a resolution is not likely to be sponsored by Asean, whoever sponsors it, most of all a Third World country or countries, China will be in a bit of a spot.

Wish for peaceful settlement

Better to complete now the COC, even if not solve all the SCS claims, and put in place a concordat that materialises China’s frequently expressed wish for peaceful settlement and regional, including SCS, development.

The cost of damaging pride and China’s standing in the world can be high.

The benefit (the flipside of the coin which can be minted to have two ugly heads), however, of economic development, and China’s further growth, can be great.

This other side – the economic side – can be developed to complete the strategy of imposing a cost on belligerence. This could be the opportunity cost of exclusion.

I have often argued the TPP is a construct important to secure regional balance. It could however go beyond balance to an exclusionary arrangement. It would be a useful tool if more regional states acceded to the trade and investment regime which is something the United States should work harder at to make happen.

China could and should be a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) but not without terms and conditions – which could include conduct that does not violate the rights of other states in the SCS. If the TPP could expand not just in membership but also into the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, there would be a really massive trade area non-membership of which would be unimaginable for China.

A lot depends on how the United States plays out this strategy and makes any grouping which it drives attractive.

China buys its way into the good books of Asean states, and out of any difficulty caused by its actions in the SCS. Here a lot depends on whether Asean states are willing to sell their soul and territory for money.

If they are, the strategic outcome, even if they do not realise it, is that they would have chosen to lead an uncertain international life under China’s tutelage.

Myanmar parliament approves Aung San Suu Kyi ‘PM-like’ role

Politics

Myanmar’s parliament has passed a bill to create the post of “state counsellor”, which gives Aung San Suu Kyi a role similar to that of prime minister. The bill now requires only presidential approval from President Htin Kyaw to become law. Unelected military representatives holding a quarter of parliamentary seats boycotted the vote, calling the bill unconstitutional. Their protest were in vain as the military is outnumbered by elected MPs from the NLD. The first bill proposed by the new civilian government therefore passed unchanged. In addition to state counsellor, Ms Suu Kyi will also be foreign minister and minister in the president’s office.

Read More >


Myanmar’s new cabinet

After the changes to the cabinet last week, this following list is the new Myanmar government. Aung San Suu Kyi holds three positions; State Counselor, Minister of the President’s Office and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Name Office Party
Aung San Suu Kyi State Counselor NLD
Aung San Suu Kyi Minister of the President’s Office NLD
Aung San Suu Kyi Minister of Foreign Affairs NLD
Aung Thu Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation NLD
Ye Aung, Lt. Gen. Minister of Border Affairs Military
Than Myint Minister of Commerce NLD
Win Khaing Minister of Construction Independent
Sein Win, Lt. Gen. Minister of Defence Military
Myo Thein Gyi Minister of Education
Pyae Myint Htun Minister of Electric Power and Energy NLD
Naing Thet Lwin Minister of Ethnic Affairs MNP
Myint Htwe Minister of Health Independent
Kyaw Swe, Lt. Gen. Minister of Home Affairs Military
Ohn Maung Minister of Hotels and Tourism Independent
Khin Maung Cho Minister of Industry Independent
Pe Myint Minister of Information Independent
Thein Swe Minister of Labour, Immigration and Population USDP
Ohn Win Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Independent
Kyaw Win Minister of Planning and Finance NLD
Aung Ko Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture USDP
Win Myat Aye Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement NLD
Thant Zin Maung Minister of Transport and Communications NLD

Read More >

 


Myanmar’s ex-president Thein Sein becomes Buddhist monk

Myanmar’s former president Thein Sein has shed his formal attire – and his hair – to become a Buddhist monk. Thein Sein’s ordination took place on 4 April, officials said, four days after he presided over the historic transition of power. Thein Sein has not spoken publicly about temporarily becoming a monk but the official statement indicated he has been considering it since January.

Read More >

 


 
Economy

Central Bank Looks to Mobile Banking to Ramp up Financial Inclusion

The Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) revealed on 4 April the official rules and regulations for mobile financial service providers (MFSPs), seen by observers as a way to reach more rural customers throughout Myanmar. Mobile banking is seen as a way to dramatically expand financial services in Myanmar to reach those in rural areas with limited access to physical bank branches and who might have irregular income, not uncommon in a country relying on agriculture.

Read More >


 

Foreign Affairs

Myanmar’s Suu Kyi meets China counterpart in FM debut

Aung San Suu Kyi met her Chinese counterpart on 5 April in the first diplomatic foray of her new pro-democracy government, underscoring the importance of relations with Beijing. China is seen as Myanmar’s biggest foreign policy preoccupation, with border wars and controversial China-backed mega-projects topping the agenda. At a press conference afterwards Suu Kyi described relations as “very important politically as well as socially and economically”.

Read More >


Canadian Foreign Minister coming to Myanmar

Canada’s Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion will visit Myanmar on 6-8 April to meet the new government. The minister will meet President Htin Kyaw and Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw.

Read More >

Friendship, family and money, but South China Sea?

26 March, 2016
As appeared in TheStar.com.my

AT the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting in Hainan last Wednesday, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang offered the five Asean countries along the Mekong river that attended it with China, US$11.5bil in loans and credit for infrastructure and other projects.

There was no time frame on disbursement and there was no indication on how the facilities would be distributed among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, who were all well represented at the meeting. Li acknowledged how the countries involved were all “family.”

The Lancang-Mekong Co-operation framework was launched in November 2014 in Myanmar at the 17th China-Asean Summit. At the time US$20bil in loans had been offered for the construction of roads, ports and railways – all much needed particularly by the less developed Asean countries.

The occasion in Myanmar provided a measure of relief to China following suspension of the Myitsone dam project in 2011.

Of course, underlying or overhanging all these substantial offers of financial largesse, are even the more massive promise of what is to come from the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and the Silk Road Fund, all of which would result in greater use of the yuan and a Co-Prosperity sphere centred on Beijing. This is not to mention huge bilateral contracts and loans with individual Asean countries, including our own.

With the piling up of all this money, it is scarce wonder there is a gravitational pull of countries in the region towards China. The extent of it however varies depending on need and pride. There is thus a self-fulfilled divided Asean without China having to do anything overt about it.

Like individuals, some countries may sell their soul for money. Others may even trade territorial integrity.

As in a family, the promise of money is sometimes linked with good behaviour and obeisance of the patriarch.

The diplomacy of relations with China among countries of the region – despite the brave front of Asean unity and centrality – is thus rather murky, with a lot of mutual suspicion.

So it might be said China has it made. However, China is undermining its economic attraction through its statements and actions supporting its extravagant claims in the South China Sea.

Miscalculation

There seems to be a miscalculation on how far it can go but still have Asean countries eating out of its hands and gawking at its financial promise.

Even if there are domestic political considerations for China’s harsh and inflexible stand, there equally is this self-belief now in China’s economic – and military – weight.

The difference between China in 2002, when it signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with the direction to negotiation of a Code of Conduct, with Asean as a whole, and China in 2012, when it hounded the Philippines from the Scarborough Shoal, is that China had become bigger and stronger in the 10 intervening years.

Suddenly China wants to negotiate only with claimant Asean states bilaterally, not Asean as a whole.

Negotiation on the Code of Conduct has dragged on and on. The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is being impressed on China by Singapore, representing Asean, to cover both naval vessels and coast guards in territorial waters as well (The CUES as signed by 21 countries in 2014 including China and the US covered the high seas and the Exclusive Economic Zone).

Even this has so far not gained any traction with China.

Meanwhile China has turned seven uninhabitable atolls in the disputed sea into artificial islands with proclaimed 12-mile territorial sea rights.

There is an expectation Scarborough Shoal would be next. American – or any – freedom of navigation operations (FON ops) are denounced as violating China’s territorial integrity, an advance on the already extensive historical and traditional rights to the South China Sea as defined by the nine-dash line.

The South China Sea is being militarised. Landing strips for fighter jets have been constructed and surface-air-missiles are in place. The US has responded with the deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group.

Territorial rights

We must defend our territorial rights, the Chinese masses demand. The Americans have increased tension by their aggressive actions, the Chinese foreign ministry proclaims.

Have we got to believe all this? Just look at who took what actions and at their sequence. We cannot be blind to the facts and to become senseless because of repetition of untruths.

Asean must show it cannot be bought. That it is not without principles and is not spineless. That, exactly, it will defend its sovereignty and integrity – which it does so well with one another in the process of integration –- against all comers.

China may be overplaying its hand. An article in Khmer Times of Cambodia, widely seen as the most pro-China of Asean states, observed last Wednesday in an article entitled “Shared-River-Shared-Future” (perhaps in keeping with Chinese dialectics to obscure what it has to say): “China may need to readjust its foreign policy approach towards South-East Asia, particularly in regard to the South China Sea disputes.

Clearly, China’s approach towards the Mekong countries is more effective than its approach towards the South China Sea.”

The incident this week, reportedly well within Indonesian territorial waters in Natuna, shows that China’s claims are expansive and threatening – and are not confined to potential clashes between the US and China alone.

They seriously affect Asean states, in this case even a non-claimant state.

After an Indonesian patrol boat had detained eight Chinese fishermen and their trawler found fishing in Indonesian territory, at least one Chinese coast guard vessel rammed the Chinese boat to try and free it.

A similar incident happened three years ago. An Indonesian patrol boat was forced to release detained Chinese crew fishing in its waters when confronted by China’s armed maritime law enforcement vessel.

This time Indonesia is not taking it lying down. Despite China’s request that the clash be kept quiet (“Don’t tell the media, we are friends after all…”), there was a strong and very public Indonesian reaction.

China’s charge d’affaires was summoned to the foreign ministry in Jakarta to receive a stiff protest.

Instead of apologising China’s foreign ministry loudly claimed that the trawler was operating in “traditional Chinese fishing grounds” when attacked and harassed by the Indonesian patrol boat.

Provocative

This only raised the temperature with Indonesian observation that “…China’s actions were especially provocative and fitted a pattern of becoming more assertive in the waters.”

Indeed a senior Indonesian official was particularly irked by China’s claims to “traditional Chinese fishing grounds” and made this strong observation: “It’s very fake, ambiguous, in terms of since when, since what year does it become historical, traditional.”

Of course with 5,000 years of Chinese history, it is a bottomless pit everyone else could fall into.

Every country, especially Asean member states, should rise to the breathtaking magnitude of China’s claims. Indonesia, not a South China Sea claimant state (something Asean non-claimant states sometimes carry as a badge of honour), was ensnared by the nine-dash line.

There could be other ramifications of China’s reach into history and traditions.

What Asean must do is to confront together the real issues of China’s claims, and not to pussy-foot around them. It should not be blinded by China’s promise of riches, as they will come at a cost, and unless they are willing to pay that cost.

Asean should also not try to pretend the South China Sea problems are problems of the claimant states alone, much less a matter between just the US and China. Asean is very much in the mix.

ASEAN Economic Community in 2025

10 March, 2016
Originally published in Asia 2025 launched by the Asia House

By the time this essay is published, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will have become reality, an important milestone in the long and winding road to the economic integration of ten ASEAN economies. However, the AEC has fallen considerably short of the target of “a single market and production base, characterised by free flow of goods, services, and investments, as well as freer flow of capital and skills” articulated in the 2007 ASEAN Charter. Despite having often expressed frustrations about the pace of integration, when I look at the AEC in the long-term context, I am impressed by what has been achieved. It is quite probable that the authors of the Charter intentionally set excessively high ambitions to drive the ASEAN Secretariat and governments to achieve as much as possible.

By the end of 2015, we achieved over 90% of the so-called AEC scorecard, with the removal of almost all tariffs, many important multilateral initiatives at various stages of implementation and the proliferation of ASEAN multinational companies. My own banking group CIMB is an example of an ASEAN multinational that would not have expanded into almost all ASEAN countries if not for the AEC, and now every day we are enabling more intra-ASEAN trade and investments because we make it easier for businesses and individuals to operate across borders. However, non-tariff barriers remain very high and prohibitive – intra-ASEAN trade remains low at less than 25% of total trade (by comparison, intra-EU trade is 70%) and anyone operating across borders in ASEAN can easily see so many ways to facilitate more intra-ASEAN trade and investments.

As the AEC is declared with much fanfare, I believe that we can safely say that ASEAN economic integration is irreversible. There is too much momentum and vested interest behind the idea now. However, there is still a huge amount of work required to make ASEAN an economic community. So the real questions to ask are “What sort of economic community will we have in ten years, in 2025”? and “Will we have achieved the Charter’s promises by then?

As someone once said, “The pessimist complains about the wind, the optimist expects it to change, the realist adjusts the sail”. If ASEAN adjusts its sail after honest reflection of why we have fallen short and what we need to do, ASEAN can no doubt become a formidable economic region.

ASEAN is already a firm engine of Asian economic growth, the world’s third fastest-growing economy after China and India, and the seventh-largest regional economy, with a combined GDP of US$2.4 trillion. Competitive companies have successfully capitalised on the scale economies of the world’s third most populous region of 633 million and taken advantage of the region’s incredible diversity in religion, race, culture and political system.

Intra-ASEAN share of total trade stood at US$608.6 billion or 24.2% as at July 2014. In 2025, it could exceed US$1 trillion and account for more than the 30% of total trade. Estimates also show that ASEAN constituted only 1.9% of the world’s GDP in 2000 but its share can more than double by 2025, with many free trade agreements signed with other countries and regions.

For these targets to be achieved by 2025, regional financial markets will have to be much more integrated, with capital easily flowing back-and-forth across borders and banks operating in multiple markets with ease. With the ASEAN Single Aviation Market and the completion of major road and rail projects, including a mega high-speed rail project linking Malaysia and Singapore, people would be able to travel cheaply and conveniently across the region, and from the region to Asia’s two mega-economies, India and China. Businesses will genuinely look at ASEAN as one region, operating horizontal or vertical synergies across borders as their business needs dictate. Skilled workers will be able to move across borders to work where they want without national-level constraints on qualifications, permits and so on.

These are not radical ambitions. The picture I paint is very much in line with the original AEC agenda, which is about bringing economies closer and generating more cross-border trade and investments. There will not be a single currency or fiscal policy convergence of any sort. However, after witnessing the trials and tribulations of the original AEC project, we all surely must agree that there need to be changes to how we implement the AEC post-2015.

To have a chance of making the 2025 that I just described a reality, ASEAN must start by quickly doing three things after the AEC is launched: 1) recognise that the AEC fell short and there is much to do and so more of the same way won’t do, 2) embrace the notion that economic integration will require some concessions of sovereignty, and 3) commit to enhancing resources of the ASEAN Secretariat and drawing on the support of the private sector.

ASEAN needs a larger and more empowered secretariat. In 2014, the ASEAN’s Secretariat’s budget was US$17 million, whereas the EU’s was €143 billion. The ASEAN Secretariat does not drive integration initiatives, but relies on inter-governmental committees. These various committees in turn operate based on consensus decision-making and are often constrained by a lack of independent views about key issues that impact member countries differently.

If we look at the experience of the ASEAN banking integration for instance, we still only have a broad framework for Qualified ASEAN banks and details are being left to bilateral negotiations between countries or reciprocity arrangements. This was clearly the outcome of least resistance and has done little to change the way cross-border banking operates in the region. I think that if there was an independent body that helps drive the process, engages private sector more effectively and has the trust of member countries to impartially address their concerns, much more would have been achieved. At this stage, surely we would have had agreements on intra-ASEAN bank office outsourcing, staff transfers and information-sharing across borders, which are value-enhancing without threatening national interests.

The “elephant in the room” as it were is the tension between the established so-called ASEAN Way and the real necessities of economic integration. Economic integration simply necessitates concessions to national sovereignty, including an empowered supranational body to not only drive integration initiatives, but also enforce commitments to it. ASEAN governments must accept the need to make decisions in the wider interest of the AEC, and must not pander to vested interest disguised as nationalism.

I remain as excited about the AEC as I was when I first heard of the concept almost ten years ago. And by 2025, we can get to the original promise land, but not if our governments are unwilling to change the way we were trying to get there. The prize is great, so we must have the will to make the change.

Going’s good in US-Asean relations… but Trump?

12 March, 2016
As appeared in TheStar.com.my

AMONG Asians, President Barack Obama will go down in history as the American President who did the most to have the US re-engage meaningfully with the Asia-Pacific.

Note that I use the word “re-engage” and not “rebalance” or “pivot” which may be an object of American policy interest, but is not the sum total of the US relationship with Asia-Pacific.

The Sunnylands US-Asean Special Summit in the middle of last month captured Obama’s abiding interest, in this case with South-East Asia. It was the first summit any country had had with Asean since it pronounced itself as a community at the end of last year. A good and clever recognition.

At the same time, the 17 points in the joint declaration of the summit was comprehensive, although they have to be worked at to make the relationship meaningful. Of all the points, perhaps the most important is on human capital, particularly development of young people and entrepreneurs, a long-held Obama belief. They are the future. The connectedness of people and ideas is just as important as that of trade and investment.

As I said at a conference organised by the US-Asean Business Council in San Francisco on Feb 17, America’s unique selling point – with Silicon Valley in the background – is in the development of human capital, of ideas, innovation, inventiveness. Put human capital on the table against the kind of financial capital China has aplenty.

This is yet to happen widely enough and, therefore, must be done to give greater content to the Asean-American relationship. Of course there is the issue of intellectual property (IP) protection, but the Americans invested in China in waves against the promise of huge growth even when investment protection was not there. In any case, IP laws are being developed in Asean, with those countries acceding to the TPP taking on clear and enforceable legal obligations on IP protection.

All this is not to say US real economic involvement in Asean is small. Asean is the largest destination in Asia for American foreign direct investment (FDI). Asean holds more US FDI (total stock US$226bil) than Japan, China and India combined (total stock US$202bil). So there is real US interest in Asean.

Even in trade, while the US market is frequently cited as so important for Asean exports, it is not often realised – including by the Americans themselves – that Asean is America’s fourth largest export market. Services trade is particularly important (US$39bil in 2014) – with the US recording a surplus of US$7bil.

All these real numbers are often put in the shade by the sharp rise in trade between Asean and China. China is No. 1 here and its footprint is established and getting larger. China has also announced various policy initiatives, such as one-belt-one-road and establishment of the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), which have great significance to Asean.

There is no reason why Asean’s closeness to one or the other should be conflicting. It is a positive sum, not zero sum game. Businesses are agnostic – as shown by the numbers in trade and investment and by future business plans of both America and China with Asean. However, while the Chinese are more evident and vociferous – as with any rising power – the Americans are more quiet and understated on the business front despite really enormous involvement in Asean.

The loud noise is coming over the South China Sea, where both parties are dangerously more than just barking at each other, with Asean seemingly caught in the middle.

At the Sunnylands summit, there was animated discussion of the South China Sea issues, with China’s name frequently cropping up of course – although in time-honoured Asean fashion there was no mention of China by name in the declaration. While this may have disappointed the Americans, there is no doubt China’s land reclamation and militarisation of disputed islands are matters of grave concern to not only the US but also Asean.

Asean’s own declarations are now clear about this concern. There is little doubt that Asean sees China’s bellicosity as a threat to the peace and security of the region however little it can do about it.

The danger for the US is to be as belligerent as well. The Americans are trying very hard to be measured in their response to China’s extravagant claims and activities. The not so innocent exercise of right of passage by American warships in international waters which China claims as its territory as well as overflights by US aircraft however are causing tensions to rise.

China’s strategy is to make the US. appear to be in the wrong should there be a conflagration. Its propaganda is that the Americans are playing a game of chicken. Before the Chinese domestic gallery, there would be a limit to how far and how long this could go on.

This is where the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues), an agreement reached in 2014 among 21 countries (which include China and the US), being pursued by Asean (through Singapore) with China for application in the South China Sea, becomes critical.

China has got to be totally recalcitrant about its rights in the South China Sea but has laid a trap for the US to appear to be the guilty party should there be a conflagration and an outbreak of conflict “in China’s territory” caused by American violation of it.

Will the Americans oblige or be calm, cool and collected? If there was a President Donald Trump, one shudders to think what is likely to happen. There might just be more than a sailing by or an overflight. And then – who knows?

An American reaction and relationship with Asia generally that is not based on engagement, which President Obama is doing, will destabilise the region. Engagement does not imply giving in to China, but managing it. Engaging Asean leads countries in the region to appreciate the issues – international rights, American objectives and China’s challenge.

The criticism in the US of President Obama’s leadership as abandoning American “exceptionalism” is based on a misunderstanding that being exceptional means being superior, always right and forcing through whatever America wants. That actually is being a bully, something the US has not always been innocent of.

American “exceptionalism” is the good that comes out of the melting pot that is America. Exceptionalism in the conduct of world affairs must mean the good that comes out of positive engagement, however powerful America may be – and it is not as overwhelmingly powerful now as it used to be.

There has been this ethic in America. It does not work in the US. It will not work in the world.

America is big in the world. It is big in its economic interest in Asean. Its military presence in the region is massive. It should use these assets intelligently and creatively, and not try to steamroll over peoples and problems.

There has never been a greater demand on the responsibility of power on America, still the No.1 power in the world, that has a lot going for it, certainly with Asean.

But to have the likes of Donald Trump lead it, or to be dominated by the kind of thinking that has driven him to the cusp of nomination of the Republican Party for President, would spell the beginning of the end of America’s place in the world, as No. 1, with Asean, or anywhere else.